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Our aim is to study by means of a laboratory experiment the impact of cheap talk communication and the emergence of turn taking in a symmetric two-player two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. A typical illustration of this type of games is the vertical differentiation model formalized by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) where firms can avoid price wars in the second stage of their interactions by offering goods of different quality levels in the first stage. Another example is the regional fiscal competition model (Justman et al., 2005) where regions have to decide first on how much to invest in infrastructures to attract firms and next, they have to design their tax policy. In this situation, if both regions are unable to diffentiate in terms of quality of infrastructures in the first stage, they will start a tax war in the second stage to attact firms, with deleterious effects on profits.
To reproduce this type of strategic situation, in the first stage of our finitely repeated two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs, two players have to choose independently and simultaneously between two options, knowing that their decisions will determine the options that will be available in the second stage and thereby the attainable payoffs. In the second stage, after being informed on the other player's choice in the first stage players have to choose independently and simultaneously between two new options.
Payoffs are determined and distributed to players only at the end of the second stage. The game has two Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. If both players opt in the first stage for the option that maximize their own payoff and disregard the payoff of their partner, they will have to choose in the second stage between two options with conflicting payoffs but which, in any case, will earn them less than if they were able to differentiate their choices in the first stage. On the opposite, coordination -corresponding to the social optimum -is 4 achieved when the two players select opposite options in each stage. In our setting this leads one player to earn more than the other one from both stages.
Our experimental design, involving repeated interactions in fixed pairs during 20 periods aims at testing whether players learn using strategies that avoid a head-to-head confrontation and allow them to coordinate on opposite choices in both stages. In particular, we examine how frequently partners adopt a turn taking strategy -meaning that each player takes turn over periods as the high earnings player -in order to maximize efficiency and reduce payoffs inequality in the long run.
We hypothesize that pre-play communication may facilitate the use of a turn taking strategy in our two-stage game. To test this hypothesis, we introduced cheap talk communication (Farrel and Rabin, 1996) in some treatments. We implemented a two-way communication treatment (Two-Way, hereafter) and a one-way communication treatment (One-Way, hereafter) . In the Two-Way treatment, subjects are allowed to exchange messages via a chat box for a minute at the beginning of each period. In the One-Way treatment only one of the two players -always the same-is allowed to send messages. The ability to send messages is determined by the relative performance of each player in a preliminary task. Endowing only one player with the right to communicate aims at testing whether this player takes advantage of his higher status to increase his claims, possibly changing the frequency of alternation between periods. 2 Our main results are threefold. First, in the absence of communication almost half of the groups selected simultaneously identical options at both stages of the game and consequently failed to solve the conflict. Our second finding is that some groups learned turn taking over time, which permitted a durable resolution of the conflict. The third result is 6 is possible. With the same game setting, Cooper and Kuhn (2012) A major difference with this previous literature is that the equilibrium payoffs of our two-stage game are asymmetric while in the previous studies payoffs were equal in equilibrium. Another difference is that while these studies used two successive different games, in our game the second stage is nested in the first one. Indeed, payoffs in the game are determined only after the two stages have been completed. Another difference with previous studies is that we do not allow players to communicate between the two stages of the game, and we compare one-way and two-way communication.
In our game, successful coordination in the two stages implies that one of the partners has to sacrifice part of his earnings in both stages. Inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) may create disutility if the same player has to sacrifice repeatedly. These preferences may motivate players to exchange between the good and the bad turn and to respect this rotation between the asymmetric outcomes over time. But turn taking may also be a profitable strategy for selfish players who want to establish a reputation of fairness in order to get higher payoffs than those obtained in case of conflict. The turn taking strategy has been modeled formally by Mui (2008, 2012) for respectively the battle-of-the-sexes game and for repeated symmetric 2x2 games (including chicken, common-pool-resources and prisoner's dilemma games) (see also Bhaskar, 2000) . They show that, without communication, a turn taking equilibrium may exist for these classes of infinitely repeated games and that the expected time taken to reach 7 such equilibrium increases in the degree of conflict between the players. Experimental evidence of turn taking has been shown in various repeated games such as a kind of chicken game (Bornstein et al., 1997) , traffic game (Helbing et al., 2005) , entry game with incomplete information (Kaplan and Ruffle, 2012) , and a sequential public good game (Bruttel and Güth, 2013) . Using an indefinitely repeated common-pool resource assignment game and a perfect stranger experimental design, Cason et al. (2013) show that players use an efficiency-enhancing turn taking strategy, learn fast this strategy, and teach it to other players, especially when the degree of conflict is lower. We contribute to this literature by considering a game with two nested stages, which may make the adoption of turn taking slower.
Only a few papers have considered turn taking and communication simultaneously as we are doing in our study. In a multi-player entry game, Zillante (2011) shows that a multiperiod signaling device (that differs from free-form communication) facilitates intertemporal cooperation and turn taking outcomes. Evans et al. (2013) find stronger evidence of turn taking in finitely repeated coordination games with dominant strategy equilibrium when cheap talk is allowed because communication stimulates pro-social behavior. Their results are robust to variations in the degree of conflict between players. Leibbrandt and Sääksvuori (2012) have shown that the structure of communication matters and that only unrestricted communication helps groups to take turn in winning a contest. We extend this literature by comparing one-way and two-way communication.
Theoretical background and experimental design and procedures

The game
We consider a two-player two-stage game with observable actions Γ=[{1,2}, {u i (s)} To sum up, the theoretical analysis of the game shows that players have to choose opposite options at both stages in order to earn the maximum possible payoff corresponding to the SPNE. It is easy to see that the SPNE of the game raise a conflict problem due to the asymmetry of payoffs.
Let us now consider the repeated version of this game. Players may try to solve the conflict by means of a turn taking strategy with a randomization in the first period (that can be avoided if communication is possible), and then a rotation between the asymmetric outcomes, with each player choosing the actions chosen by the other player in the previous 10 period. If players do not deviate from this strategy, turn taking may last. Lau and Mui (2012) demonstrate how such a strategy profile can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium in a symmetric infinite horizon repeated game, if this strategy profile is unique and symmetric.
Experimental design
The experiment consists of three treatments and we used a between-subject design.
Baseline treatment
The Baseline treatment consists of 20 periods of the two-stage coordination game described in sub-section 3.1. We pair participants at the beginning of a session and it is made common knowledge that pairs remain fixed throughout the session. Using a partner matching protocol allows us to study inter-temporal coordination within pairs.
Each period is constructed as follows. Knowing the whole payoff matrix for the two stages of the game, each participant has to choose simultaneously and independently between options A and B. Then, after receiving a feedback on the choice of his coparticipant, each player has to choose between options X and Y. Then, participants are informed on their co-player's second choice and payoffs are displayed. Participants have also an opportunity to fill out a history table on a sheet of paper to keep track of previous plays and payoffs.
The communication treatments
The Two-Way communication treatment is similar to the Baseline, except that in this treatment players are allowed to exchange free-form messages during one minute at the beginning of the first stage of each period, using a chat box. Communication is not permitted between the two stages. Messages are free, except for the usual rules preserving anonymity 11 and decent language. This treatment aims at testing whether individuals learn more rapidly to coordinate on the SPNE, in particular by using a turn taking strategy.
In the One-Way treatment, only one player in each pair is allowed to send messages and thus communication is limited to 20 seconds. To designate this player, we added a preliminary part in which participants have to perform a memory task during five minutes, before receiving instructions for the main game. 6 The task is not incentivized, but participants are informed that their performance will be used to assign roles in the next part of the experiment. After five minutes, we compare the relative performance of participants and divide them into two equal groups. Players are informed that the computer program then creates pairs composed of one player with median or above-median performance and one player with below-median performance. In each pair, the player with above-median performance is allowed to send messages throughout the session.
This treatment aims at testing how endowing one of the two players with the right to communicate affects coordination. In particular we test if it motivates the player who got a higher status to try to keep a higher share of the payoffs, for example by proposing a less frequent rotation in turn taking compared to the previous treatment.
Elicitation of individual characteristics
Individual characteristics may ease or hamper coordination. We have therefore measured some of them. In particular, we elicited risk attitudes at the beginning of the sessions, using the procedure of Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Charness and Gneezy (2012) . Each subject is endowed with 80 monetary units and has to choose how much to invest (between 0 and 80) in a risky investment. With 50% chance the investment returns 2.5 times its amount and with 50% chance it is lost. A risk neutral expected utility maximizer should invest all his endowment, otherwise the individual is classified as risk averse. The participants received a feedback on the outcome of the random draw only at the end of the session. At the end of the experiment, a demographic questionnaire was also administered, including questions on gender, age, and relative wealth of the family compared to other students (on a scale from 0 for the poorer to 10 for the wealthier).
Procedures
The experiment was conducted at GATE-LAB, Lyon, France. 162 participants were recruited from local engineering and business schools, using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . respectively. The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to a computer after drawing a tag from an opaque bag. Sets of instructions were distributed after each part and read aloud. The payoff matrix ( Fig.1 ) was distributed with the instructions (see Appendix 2). To facilitate its reading, each player was identified with a color (red for the row player and blue for the column player). In addition, we displayed the whole matrix at the beginning of each first stage and the relevant sub-matrix at the beginning of each second stage on the computer screens. Therefore, subjects had in front of them all relevant information when making their decisions. The understanding of participants was checked by means of a questionnaire and all questions were answered in private.
On average a session lasted 90 minutes, including payment. The participants were paid the sum of their earnings in each period in addition to their earnings from the risk elicitation 13 task, at the rate of 1 experimental currency unit = 0.05 Euro. In addition, they were paid a €4
show-up fee. On average, participants earned € 17.20 (S.D.=3.30). Payments were made individually in cash and in private in a separate room.
Results
Coordination
We define coordination as a situation in which the two players select opposite options at both stages of the game. To study how groups coordinate, we focus on the following three situations. First, the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium that requires that the two players choose opposite options in the two stages of the game: they play A and B in the first stage and Y and X, respectively, in the second stage (which corresponds to their dominant strategy in the symmetric subgames two and three, see Figure 1 ). Second, the situation when the two players fail to coordinate in the first stage (both play A or B) and play their dominant strategy in the second stage (both choose X, which corresponds to playing the Nash equilibrium in subgames one and four), which leads both subjects to jointly earn the lowest possible payoffs. The third relevant situation might be considered as a fallback situation and it occurs when the two players make the same choice in the first stage (both play A or B) but do not play the Nash equilibrium in subgames one and four (both choose Y), in order to attain the Pareto optimal outcome in these subgames. In this last case, both subjects earn a slightly higher payoff than that obtained when playing the Nash Equilibrium.
Only a few groups, after selecting opposite options in the first-stage of the game, opted for identical options in the second-stage (6.61% of the groups in the Baseline, 4.10% in the Two-Way and 4.83% in the One-Way). It is clear that the first-stage choices are crucial to the success of coordination in pairs. This is why we first report the analysis of behavior in the first stage before analyzing the data for the two stages taken together.
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Differentiation in the first stage of the game
In the first stage of the Baseline, both players choose option A in 32.86% of the cases (184 /560 pairs*periods) and both choose option B in only 7.14% of the cases (40 /560 pairs*periods). Both players' preference for option A is not surprising since it allows them to avoid the proper game that leads to the lowest payoffs (the lower right proper subgame in Figure 1 ). Both players choose option A in only 7.05% (31/440) and 6.5% (39/600) of the observations in the Two-Way and One-Way treatments, respectively. Again, these percentages are significantly different from those in the Baseline (p<0.001 in both cases), but they do not differ from each other (p=0.977). The percentages of choices of option B by both players are respectively 2.95% (13/440) and 1.33% (8/600). These percentages do differ statistically from those in the Baseline (p=0.016 and p=0.003, respectively) and but not from each other (p=0.943). Thus, when they can discuss on a strategy (Two-Way continued throughout the game. Wilcoxon tests (W, hereafter) at the pair level indicate significant differences between the first ten and the last ten periods in the mean percentages of differentiated choices (p=0.004), choice of option A by both players (p=0.011), and choice of option B by both (p=0.067). However, even in the last block of five periods, there are still 30% of the pairs that are not able to coordinate on opposite choices. In the absence of communication, it takes time for the players to learn differentiating their action. It is a standard result in coordination games but the difficulty is stronger here since one player has to accept to earn less in the anticipation of the second stage.
Learning occurs also in the communication treatments but it is more immediate.
Wilcoxon tests indicate significant differences between the first ten and the last ten periods in the mean percentages of differentiated choices in the Two-Way and in the One-Way treatment (p=0.002 and p=0.018, respectively). In the Two-Way treatment we find significant differences in the mean percentages of choice of option A by both players Table 1 shows that the players are able to coordinate on the SPNE in only 53.39% of the cases. When they are not able to differentiate their choices in the first stage, they are more likely to play the Nash equilibrium of the sub-game than the optimum (20.71% vs. 5%, respectively).
In contrast, communication makes coordination on the SPNE significantly more likely than in the Baseline (MW test, p<0.001 in both the Two-Way and One-Way treatments).
Indeed, pairs are able to coordinate in 85.68% and 86.61% of the cases in the Two-Way and the One-Way treatments, respectively (p=0.949). While the percentage of pairs that played the SPNE more than 10 periods in total was only 14% in the Baseline, it is 91% in the TwoWay treatment and 90% in the One-Way treatment. When pairs made the same choice in the first stage, players play also significantly differently the Nash equilibrium in the second stage compared to the Baseline (p<0.001 in both treatments). Indeed, this characterizes only 2.50% and 2.90% of the observations in the Two-Way and One-way treatments, respectively. A difference is found in the choice of the optimum in the second stage in pairwise comparisons for the One-Way treatment (p=0.056) but not in the Two-Way treatment (p=0.458). Finally, while there were more than 20% of the observations that could not be characterized in the Baseline, this represents less than 10% of the observations in the treatments with communication (p<0.001).
Table 1 also reveals that some learning occurs. In the Baseline, the SPNE is played in 36.43% of the cases during the first five periods. This percentage increases to 46.43% in periods 6 to 10 and 62.86% in periods 11 to 15 to stabilize at 67.86% towards the end of the game. Pairs are significantly more likely to play the SPNE in the second part of the game than in the first one (W test, p=0.004). However, even in the last block of five periods, the number of pairs playing the SPNE remains different compared to both the Two-Way and the To complement this analysis, we now report the results of an econometric analysis. Table 2 presents the estimates of Probit models in which the dependent variable is the probability for a pair of subjects to play the SPNE. Standard errors are clustered at the pair level since groups are fixed throughout the session. Model (1) pools the data of all treatments, model (2) considers the data from the Baseline, and model (3) the data from the treatments with communication. In model (1) the independent variables include dummies for treatments (the Baseline is the reference category). Model (3) includes a dummy variable for the One-Way treatment. In all models, the independent variables include a time trend and various mean individual characteristics of the pairs. The latter consist of the number of females in the pair, the mean wealth, the within-pair difference in wealth, the mean risk index and the within-pair difference in the risk index. Indeed, players with different characteristics matched in the same pair may possibly coordinate more easily. Table 2 reports marginal effects. The regressions reported in Table 2 confirm that the likelihood to play the SPNE is significantly higher in the two treatments with communication (model (1)). This result is in accordance with the literature showing that communication considerably increases the likelihood of coordination on an efficient equilibrium (Cooper et al., 1992; Blume and Ortmann, 2007; Brandts and Cooper, 2007) . In contrast, model (3) shows that giving a stronger influence to one of the pair member does not affect coordination. The significant effect of the time trend shows evidence of learning within pairs. The marginal effect is especially large in the Baseline (model (2)). Interestingly, we find that pairs with more females are more likely to play the SPNE when communication is not available but not when communication is possible. A lower mean risk aversion increases the probability of playing the SPNE in communication treatments and when data of all treatments are pooled but the difference in the degree of risk aversion in the pair has no effect.
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Result 1: In a two-stage game where the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium requires that the two players make opposite choices in both stages and accept unequal payoffs, only half of the pairs are able to coordinate in the absence of communication.
Result 2: Communication increases dramatically the probability of pairs to play the SPNE. Assigning to only one player the right to communicate does not affect this probability.
Turn taking and submission
In this last sub-section we examine two possible coordination strategies in pairs: turn taking and submission. Turn taking means that players exchange the bad turn (choosing option B that yields a payoff of 8 ECU) and the good turn (choosing option A that yields a payoff of 12 ECU) repeatedly (every period, every two, four, five or even after 10 periods). We impose that the strategy is observed for at least 10 periods to characterize the pair of players as turn takers. Submission is the opposite of turn taking: one pair member always keeps the bad turn for himself and leaves the good turn to his partner.
In the Baseline treatment, turn taking remains seldom and is applied by only 5 pairs out of 28 (17.86%) continuously for at least 10 periods until the end of the game. 10 One of these pairs was able to implement this strategy from the second period. On the opposite, two pairs play the SPNE repeatedly but never exchange turns, one player dominating the other one who makes an attempt to change turns but gives up rapidly.
Communication undeniably improves the probability of turn taking. The great majority of pairs take turns during at least 10 periods when communication is allowed (90.90% and 77.41% of the pairs in the Two-Way and the One-Way treatments, respectively). These proportions are both significantly different from that in the Baseline (proportion tests, 
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Baseline is significantly different compared to both the Two-Way and the One-Way treatments (MW tests, p<0.001 in both) but there is no difference between the two communication treatments (MW test, p=0.386) . This suggests that communication is not only crucial to initiate this strategy but also to sustain it.
To further investigate the determinants of turn taking we estimate Probit models in which the dependent variable takes value 1 if the pair has played a turn taking strategy for at least 10 periods in a row, and 0 otherwise. One pair gives only one observation in these models. Model (1) is for the whole sample, model (2) restricts the sample to the Baseline treatment and model (3) to the treatments with communication. For consistency, we add the same independent variables as in the regressions reported in Table 2 , except for the time trend. Table 3 reports marginal effects. Table 3 . Determinants of the probability of pairs to use turn taking in at least 10 periods To sum up, we have the following findings.
Result 3: In a two-stage game with a SPNE with asymmetric payoffs, less than one fifth of pairs use a turn taking strategy when no communication is allowed.
Result 4: Communication increases the ability of players to implement durably a turn taking strategy to coordinate on the SPNE. There is no difference between two-way and one-way modes of communication in the probability of turn taking.
Result 5: Communication is more crucial to initiate a turn taking strategy of coordination than to sustain it.
Conclusion
Our laboratory experiment investigates how individuals can coordinate in a two-stage game that captures some real features, like investment in infrastructure and fiscal competition between regions or vertical differentiation between firms. The literature has shown how frequent are coordination failures in one-stage games, and how communication can help individuals to coordinate, notably by implementing strategies like turn taking in order to reduce long-term payoff inequality. Our contribution is to study whether communication has the same ability to overcome coordination failures in a two-stage game where the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium requires that the two players make opposite choices in both stages and accept unequal payoffs.
We find that coordination failures occur in almost half of the time and less than one fifth of pairs use a turn taking strategy to alleviate long-term payoff inequality.
Communication increases dramatically coordination on the SPNE. This results from the fact that it increases the ability of players to initiate a turn taking strategy between the players. Its impacts is also important in sustaining it. Finally, allowing both players or only one player to send messages to his partner has no effect on the probability of using turn taking and 25 coordinating on the SPNE. Indeed, in the One-Way treatment in one fourth (25,81%) of the groups the player that could send the messages was also the one that started with the bad turn indicating the will of these players to implement turn taking.
By communicating together subjects were able to establish a long-lasting strategy that allowed them to increase efficiency and decrease inequality by exchanging their relative positions in a fair way. Our results show that communication is able to solve coordination conflicts even in more complex situations than in the one-stage games usually studied until now.
A natural extension of this research could aim at determining the frontiers of positive communication effects on conflict resolution. This would require strengthening the difficulty of finding a consensus in our two-stage game, for example by introducing a stronger conflict in the second stage of the game. The payoff structure could be modified such that the Subgame Perfect Equilibium no longer corresponds to the social optimum. Finally, the decisions could be made partially or completely irreversible so that the application of turn taking would become more complicated.
You will be informed of your payoff in this first part only at the end of the session.
To sum up: You have to choose now the amount you wish to invest and the color. At the end of the session, the program will randomly select a color for all the participants and it will indicate to you the color randomly selected as well as your payoff for this part that will be added to your payoffs of the second part.
Please read these instructions. If you have any question about these instructions, please raise your hand and we will answer these questions in private.
Part 2 (distributed after completion of Part 1)
This part includes 20 independent periods.
Before the beginning of the first period, the computer program will randomly divide the participants in this session between Red participants and Blue participants. There are as many Red participants as Blue participants.
During these 20 periods, you will be either a Blue participant or a Red participant. You will keep the same color throughout the whole session. You will be informed of your color before the beginning of the first period.
At the beginning of this part, the computer program will form pairs composed of a Blue participant and a Red participant. You will be randomly paired with another participant in this session who has a different color from yours. You will remain paired with the same co-participant during the 20 periods. You will never know the identity of your co-participant.
Description of each period
Each period consists of two stages. During each of the two stages you will have to choose between two options. If you want to stop the communication before the minute has elapsed, press the "OK" button. Once you or your co-participant press the "OK" button, the dialog box is no longer available and the next screen appears at the same time for both co-participants. As soon as one of you press the "OK" button it is no longer possible to send messages. If you do not press the "OK" button, the dialog box closes automatically after one minute, and the next screen appears. ]
Stage 1
You have to choose between option A and option B. Your co-participant also chooses between these two options simultaneously.
Once you and your co-participant have made your choices, you will be informed of the choice of your co-participant and your co-participant will be informed of your choice.
Stage 2
You have to choose between option X and option Y. Your co-participant also chooses between these two options simultaneously.
Once you and your co-participant have made your choices, you will be informed of the choice of your co-participant and your co-participant will be informed of your choice. You are then informed of your payoff and of the payoff of your co-participant. The period ends and another period starts automatically.
Calculation of payoffs
Your payoffs and the payoffs of your co-participant in the period depend on the choices between options A and B and between options X and Y. Table 1, in the attached sheet, represents all possible payoffs in a period. Please refer to this table. Table 1 At the beginning of stage 2, only one of the 4 panels of Table 1 will be used to determine your payoffs for the period given your choice and the choice of your co-participant between options X and Y. We describe below the four possible cases, each case refers to a table in the attached sheet. Table 4 describes the possible payoffs given the choices made between X and Y in stage 2. Table 4 reproduces the North East panel of Table 1 Table 5 describes the possible payoffs given choices made between X and Y in stage 2. -Both participants chose option X. The Red participant earns 5 ECU and the Blue participant earns 8 ECU.
-Both participants chose option Y. The Red participant earns 5 ECU and the Blue participant earns 14 ECU. At the end of stage 2, you will be informed of the choice of your co-participant, of your payoff and of the payoff of your co-participant in this period. The next period will start automatically.
You have at your disposal on your desk a history table that allows you to take notes on your decisions and the decisions of your co-participant and on the associated payoffs in each period.
End of the part
At the end of the 20 periods, you will be informed of your total payoff in this part. Your total payoff in this part is the sum of your payoffs in each of the 20 periods.
Then, a final questionnaire will appear on your screen. Afterwards, you will be informed when to go to the payment room.
----Please read again these instructions. If you have any question, raise your hand and we will answer to your questions in private. Thank you to fill out the understanding questionnaire that has been distributed. We will come to you to check your answers in private.
---- 
Instructions for the additional Part 2 and for Part 3 in the One Way Communication
Part 2
In this part, we ask you to perform a task. Your score in this task will be compared to the scores of the other participants and it will be used to determine your role in the next part, as explained below.
Description of the task
At the beginning of this part your screen will show 16 black rectangles, as shown in the figure below:
On the screen, the 16 black rectangles hide 8 pairs of identical images. The task is to reform a maximum of pairs of identical images for a period of 5 minutes. You score 1 point each time you form a pair of identical images, as shown in the figure below.
To see the image that hides behind a black rectangle, press the gray button to the left of the black rectangle. The first uncovered image remains visible while you are uncovering a second image. You can press gray buttons as many times as you want but you can only see two images at once.
If the two images you just uncovered are not identical, they disappear again behind black rectangles after half a second. When two identical images are displayed at the same time, your score increases by 1 point and the 2 identical images remain permanently visible. To facilitate the search for pairs of identical images, you should try to memorize the images already uncovered behind the black rectangles.
Once you have uncovered the 8 pairs of images on the screen, a new screen appears with the same images, but arranged randomly in a different way. These images include a ball, a die, two kinds of butterflies, two types of bottles and two kinds of leaves.
Your total score in this part is given by the number of pairs of identical images you have been able to reform during 5 minutes. To familiarize yourself with the task, you will have the chance to train for two minutes. At the end of this training period, the part will start automatically.
Relative performance
At the end of this part the computer program will compare the scores of the participants in the room. It will define two groups according to the scores. One group will be composed of the half of participants who have the highest scores and the other group will be composed of the half of participants who have the lowest scores. Depending on your score you will be assigned to one of the two groups and your role will be different in the third part of this experiment. Please read again these instructions. If you have any question, please raise your hand and we will answer to you in private.
Part 3 (distributed after completion of Part 2)
At the beginning of this part, the computer program will form pairs. You will be randomly paired with another participant in this session. You will remain paired with the same co-participant during the 20 periods. You will never know the identity of your co-participant.
Within each pair, one of the participants will be able to send messages to the other participant at the beginning of each period. It is always the same participant who will be able to send messages to the other.
To determine the participants who can send the messages, the computer program rank participants in this session based on the scores achieved in part 2. It forms two groups of equal size according to the scores achieved. Participants who belong to the group that made the highest scores in Part 2 will be allowed to send messages to their co-participant who belongs to the other group.
In addition, before the beginning of the first period, the computer program will randomly divide the participants in this session between Red and Blue participants. There are as many Red participants as Blue participants. Each pair consists of a Red participant and a Blue participant. Thus, during these 20 periods, you will either be a Blue participant or a Red participant. You will keep the same color throughout the session. In the pair, the participant who can send messages to the other participant can be either the Red participant or the Blue participant. The color assignment is independent of the ability to send messages.
You will be informed of your color before the beginning of the first period. The program will also inform you whether you are or not allowed to send messages to your co-participant, as explained below.
Description of each period
Each period consists of two stages. During each of the two stages you will have to choose between two options.
At the beginning of each period, before starting the first stage, if you are the participant who can send messages to your co-participant, you can communicate with your co-participant. A dialog box will appear on your screen for this purpose. For a maximum of 20 seconds, you can use this box to send messages to your co-participant. Messages should not include information that identifies you or your co-participant. They must not contain rude language or threats.
If you want to stop the communication before the 20 seconds have elapsed, press the "OK" button. Once you have pressed the "OK" button, the dialog box is no longer available and the next screen appears at the same time for both co-participants. If you do not press the "OK" button, the dialog box closes automatically after 20 seconds, and the next screen appears.
If you are the participant who is not allowed to send a message to your co-participant, you will see your co-participant's messages appear in the dialog box on your screen. However, you cannot respond.
The rest of the instructions is similar to the other treatments.
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Appendix 3 
